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UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
THE UNITED STATES VIOLATES THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF A DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE VICTIM AND HER CHILDREN
In August 2011, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights 
(Commission) published its merits report 
on a petition submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union on behalf of Jessica 
Lenahan (formerly Gonzales) of Castle 
Rock, Colorado against the United States 
(U.S.). The Commission found that the 
U.S. had violated Lenahan’s three daugh-
ters’ rights to life, equal protection, and 
special protection as girl-children.
Lenahan v. U.S. is the first case brought 
against the U.S. before the Commission 
that draws domestic violence into the 
international human rights arena. The 
Commission’s decision emphasizes states’
obligations to protect people from rec-
ognized dangers, an obligation the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejects.
In May 1999, Lenahan was granted a 
restraining order against her estranged and 
violent husband, Simon Gonzales, also 
the girls’ father. The following month, 
Gonzales took her daughters without 
informing Lenahan, violating the restrain-
ing order that had granted Lenahan sole 
physical custody. In clear distress, Lenahan 
communicated with the Castle Rock Police 
Department (Police Department) eight 
times in ten hours. Her complaints were 
summarily dismissed. When Gonzales 
drove to the police station and opened
fire, police returned fire, killing him. 
Afterwards, the officers found the girls’ 
bodies in Gonzales’ truck, though it 
remains unclear whether they were killed 
by Gonzales or by the officers’ return fire.
Lenahan filed suit against the town 
of Castle Rock for failing to protect her 
daughters. Lenahan argued that the town 
deprived her of her property interest in 
the restraining order without due pro-
cess of law when the Police Department 
failed to enforce the restraining order. 
The District Court dismissed the case 
because it found no evidence of a viola-
tion of Lenahan’s right to due process. The 
Court of Appeals found that Lenahan had 
a cognizable procedural due process claim 
and remanded for further consideration. 
Castle Rock sought certiorari, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court accepted the case in 2004. 
In June 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Castle Rock had not violated Lenahan’s 
due process rights. Instead, it found that 
Colorado’s statute did not obligate the 
Police Department to respond to her com-
plaints, but permitted officers to exercise 
discretion over enforcing the restraining 
order.
Having exhausted her domestic rem-
edies, Lenahan petitioned the Commission 
to hear her case in December 2005, arguing 
that the U.S. had violated her daughters’ 
right to life when it failed to protect them 
from a known danger. The Commission 
found the case admissible in July 2007. 
Before the Commission, the U.S. contested 
that Lenahan had informed the officers 
of the valid restraining order and that she 
had adequately communicated the danger 
Gonzales presented to her children. The 
U.S. also claimed that Lenahan did have 
full access to judicial process, and that 
the Supreme Court’s ruling against her did 
not indicate that she was denied judicial 
protection.
Notably, the U.S. claimed that the 
American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man (American Declaration) 
does not impose an affirmative duty to 
protect individuals from private actors 
and that, given the information it alleged 
was provided by Lenahan, the Police 
Department responded in accordance with 
its obligations under domestic and interna-
tional law. The U.S. argued that even if the 
American Declaration did impose an affir-
mative duty, it is merely a declaration of 
human rights principles and not a binding 
legal instrument. Moreover, the U.S. con-
tended that the Commission’s recommen-
dations do not create any legal obligations 
because it has not ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights (American 
Convention).
The Commission held in its merits 
report, however, that the U.S. was in fact 
aware the three girls were in danger and 
failed to protect them, thus violating their 
right to life (Article I) under the American 
Declaration. In issuing the restraining order 
against Gonzales, the police had acknowl-
edged the risk he posed to Lenahan and her 
daughters, creating an obligation to protect 
them from that risk. Furthermore, since the 
U.S. did not conduct a “prompt, thorough, 
exhaustive and impartial” investigation 
into the girls’ deaths, it violated their rights 
to equal protection (Article II), judicial 
protection (Article XVIII), and special pro-
tection as girl-children (Article VII).
The Commission reiterated that the 
norms embodied by the American 
Declaration are recognized as a source of 
legal obligation for all OAS member states 
and therefore, the U.S. should adhere to 
them. The Commission concluded the mer-
its report by recommending that the U.S. 
thoroughly investigate the girls’ deaths, 
provide reparations to Lenahan, and adopt 
legislation requiring the enforcement of 
restraining orders and the protection of 
children harmed by domestic violence. 
Although the Commission cannot enforce 
compliance with its recommendations, the 
decision does serve as persuasive authority, 
as well as an admonition of the U.S.’s lack 
of protection of domestic violence victims 
and survivors.
VENEZUELA FAILS TO ADHERE TO 
INTER-AMERICAN COURT RULING
In September 2011, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American 
Court) ruled in López Mendoza v. 
Venezuela that the State had violated presi-
dential candidate Leopoldo López’s right 
to be elected by prohibiting him from 
holding public office. Though the deci-
sion is binding on Venezuela since it is 
a party to the American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention), 
it is unclear whether Venezuela will heed 
the ruling. The State’s Supreme Court of 
Justice recently overruled López Mendoza 
v. Venezuela, declaring the Inter-American 
Court’s ruling “unenforceable” because 
López is only temporarily barred from 
serving in public office and was not denied 
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the right to vote or exercise other politi-
cal rights. Civil society has criticized the 
Supreme Court’s decision for flagrantly 
ignoring international law.
Leopoldo López is a former mayor 
of Chacao who was prohibited from run-
ning for mayor of Caracas after the State 
brought two corruption charges against 
him. López was accused of budgetary and 
fiscal irregularities as mayor and as a state 
oil company employee. He was tried in 
two administrative proceedings and fined. 
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Justice 
prohibited López, along with 276 other 
politicians, from running for public office.
In March 2008, López petitioned the 
Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Commission) to hear his case, 
arguing that his rights to participate in gov-
ernment and to due process had been vio-
lated when he was prevented from serving 
in an elected position without first being 
convicted in a criminal court. He claimed 
that an individual could only be prevented 
from holding an elected position through 
a criminal proceeding. The Commission 
found the case admissible in July 2008 and 
submitted it to the Inter-American Court 
for adjudication in December 2009.
The Inter-American Court ruled that 
López’s right to participate in govern-
ment under Article 23 of the American 
Convention was violated when he was 
prohibited from holding public office with-
out being convicted by a criminal court. 
Additionally, the Inter-American Court 
found that the State had violated López’s 
right to a defense under Article 8 by not 
requiring concrete evidence of López’s cor-
ruption in the administrative proceedings 
against him. The Inter-American Court 
found that the Supreme Court of Justice’s 
issuance of a decision after three and a half 
years was reasonable considering the case’s 
complexity. Finally, it ruled that the State 
did not violate López’s right to equality 
before the law under Article 24, since there 
was insufficient evidence to determine 
whether the other 276 candidates prevented 
from running for election had been treated 
differently.
The State argued before the Inter-
American Court that it had not violated 
López’s rights because a criminal convic-
tion was only necessary for the total depri-
vation of a person’s right to be elected, not 
for a temporary sanction. The State also 
argued that the administrative process pro-
vided an adequate procedure for petitioners 
to defend themselves. The Inter-American 
Court rejected both arguments by holding 
that the right to be elected can only be 
restricted after a criminal conviction.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez 
has expressed disapproval of the Inter-
American Court’s ruling, claiming that it 
violates the State’s sovereignty. The State’s 
Attorney General brought the issue to the 
Supreme Court of Justice in September 
2011, which held that the Inter-American 
Court’s decision was unenforceable and
that López’s political rights had not been 
violated. The Supreme Court of Justice 
determined that López would not be 
allowed to serve in public office despite a 
Constitutional provision according interna-
tional treaties the same weight as domestic 
law. The Supreme Court of Justice decision 
clarified that López is only prohibited from 
actually serving in an elected position, not 
from running. As of October 19, 2011, 
Lopez is now running for president, having 
been granted permission by the Consejo 
Nacional Electoral (National Electoral 
Council, CNE). The CNE, deriving its 
authority from Venezuela’s Constitution, 
was designed to be insulated from the 
political process.
This is not the first time President 
Chávez and his administration have used 
the courts to assert political power. In 
May 2004, President Chávez signed a 
law increasing the number of Supreme 
Court justices and creating two new 
methods of removing justices. The law 
facilitates filling the available positions
with justices who are likely to support 
President Chávez’s policies. A February 
2010 Commission report found that the 
State intimidates and punishes those with 
contrary political opinions. In addition, the 
State has increased the scope of its insult 
laws and the penalty for “incitement,” 
which gives the government censorship 
power. These laws and reports, along with 
the Supreme Court of Justice’s recent deci-
sion, indicate that Venezuela is continuing 
to use all three branches of government to 
repress political opposition. Though the 
CNE’s decision to allow López to regis-
ter contrary to President Chávez’s wishes 
could be an indication of coming change, 
it remains to be seen whether the Supreme 
Court of Justice would allow López to take 
office if elected.
Anna Taylor, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Inter-American System 
for the Human Rights Brief.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ECTHR DECISION FOR RUSSIAN 
OIL COMPANY EMPHASIZES FOCUS 
ON PROCEDURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS
The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) ruled on September 20, 2011, 
that Russia violated defunct Russian oil 
company Yukos’ rights to property and a 
fair trial but dismissed charges that the 
acts were politically motivated. The case 
of Yukos v. Russia arose from a tax-evasion 
investigation that bankrupted one of the 
country’s largest companies and jailed two 
of its top executives. Corporate plain-
tiffs, while permitted, are uncommon under 
Article 34 of the ECHR, which allows 
individuals, non-governmental organiza-
tion, and any “group of people” to bring a 
case against any country that is party to the 
convention. In ECtHR jurisprudence, the 
occurrence of cases brought by companies 
or individuals with corporate interests are 
rare, accounting for only 3.8 percent of the 
1998-2003 case law.
Yukos filed a claim with the ECtHR 
shortly after the Russian Tax Ministry 
issued an initial ruling in April 2004 that 
because the company had used illegal tax 
shelters, it owed $2.88 billion, a figure that 
eventually grew to more than $10 billion. 
Immediately after the ruling, the govern-
ment began freezing the company’s assets, 
and within three months, Yukos’ claim in 
the Moscow City Commercial Court and 
its subsequent appeal were denied and 
the government sold a large part of the 
company. By 2007, after exhausting all 
domestic appeals and failing to strike an 
agreement with the Tax Ministry for repay-
ment, the company dissolved. Yukos’ com-
plaint to the ECtHR alleged that the speed 
of the proceedings violated Russian law 
and prevented an adequate defense under 
Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The complaint 
further alleged that the tax enforcement 
and selling of assets were “unlawful, arbi-
trary and disproportionate” under Article 1 
of Protocol 1 and Articles 1, 7, 13, 14, and 
18 of the ECHR.
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The ECtHR Chamber found that the 
proceedings moved faster than the already 
rapid Russian legal system allows and vio-
lated minimum protections under Article 
6(3) by failing to provide adequate time to 
review all the relevant material, some of 
which was provided just four days before 
the initial trial. The Chamber further found 
Russia in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 
1—the right to property—by assessing dis-
proportionate fines and prematurely seiz-
ing company assets. The ECtHR also ruled, 
however, that because the tax investigation 
was legitimate and no evidence was pro-
vided that other companies used Yukos’ 
methods, there were no grounds for claims 
of prejudicial treatment.
The human rights community has 
been critical of the Yukos case, espe-
cially of the potentially political under-
tones of dismantling Yukos and jailing it’s 
CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a critic of 
the Putin administration whom Amnesty 
International declared in 2011 a “prisoner 
of conscience.” The claims of political 
prejudice failed in both the Yukos case and 
Khodorkovsky’s own case earlier this year. 
Antoine Buyse, senior researcher at the 
Netherlands Institute of Human Rights in 
Utrecht, explained that because the ECtHR 
is concerned about Russia implementing 
its rulings, “the court prefers to stay on 
firm ground and finds violations which can 
be clearly argued.”
Such an approach is common with the 
court’s history of finding procedural human 
rights violations with the ECtHR basing 
nearly half of its decisions from 1959-
2009 in a right to a fair trial. The other 
issue in the Yukos case, the protection of 
property, is the second most cited right in 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. By dismissing 
the issue of political prejudice in the Yukos 
trial, the court averts a decision that would 
be much less palatable to Russia, which is 
the defendant state in nearly a quarter of 
new cases brought in 2009. The ECtHR’s 
decision may thus appear at odds with the 
concept of broad human rights protection, 
but the court is unlike many other bodies 
in that its decisions are binding across the 
47 member states of the Council of Europe. 
Given the mandate of the ECtHR and the 
political conditions in its member states, 
the case might be a template for a perma-
nent, regional body to successfully protect 
the human rights of an entire continent 
while maintaining relations and sustaining 
cooperation from member states.
TWO DECISIONS EXPAND 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF 
EUROPEAN COURT
Judicial enforcement of human rights 
violations during foreign intervention was 
expanded by two Grand Chamber deci-
sions handed down by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) in July 2011. 
Both cases arise from the war in Iraq, 
where the human rights community has 
voiced frustration over perceived violations 
by occupying powers.
In Al-Skeini and others v. the United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR expanded its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) outside the borders of its member 
states. Previous jurisprudence had limited 
such application to nations over which a 
European state controls—a standard of 
occupation much higher than the UK’s 
involvement in Iraq. British troops joined 
the initial invasion in 2003, and the United 
Kingdom (UK) was responsible for secu-
rity in the region of southern Iraq in which 
the six Iraqi nationals whose families filed 
suit were killed in 2003. The families 
claim British soldiers were responsible 
and brought the ECtHR suit over allegedly 
inadequate investigations by the British 
government into the deaths. The ECtHR 
rejected the UK’s claim that the ECHR 
did not apply, noting that there still existed 
restrictions on application outside of bor-
ders, but that under the special circum-
stance where a country “exercised public 
powers on the territory of another State,” 
jurisdiction could be established by control 
over that territory’s people. Specifically, 
the ECtHR’s conclusion established juris-
diction within ECHR Article 1, the obliga-
tion to protect. Once that bar was met, the 
ECtHR found a violation of Article 2—the 
right to life—for the failure to investigate.
In a separate decision issued the same 
day, the ECtHR further expanded the 
court’s jurisdiction in Iraq to cover a mem-
ber state’s detention of a man, without 
trial, for suspected terrorist recruitment. In 
Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, an Iraqi 
man with British citizenship was held in a 
UK-controlled detention facility in Iraq for 
three years before being stripped of his citi-
zenship but released without charges. The 
ECtHR found the British government in 
violation of ECHR Article 5.1—the right 
to liberty and security—after the court dis-
missed the claim that UN Security Council 
Resolution 1546, which authorized the 
war, superseded the ECHR and bound the 
British government to reject the conven-
tion. The court did not completely rule out 
the possibility that a UN resolution could 
supersede application of the ECHR, but 
limited it to instances where the resolution 
was specific.
The decision in Al-Skeini has been 
heralded as a landmark case by human 
rights groups, who see it as facilitating 
the universal application of international 
human rights law. “The European Court 
has spoken clearly—Britain can’t claim its 
soldiers have no human rights duties once 
they are in another country,” said Clive 
Baldwin, senior legal advisor to Human 
Rights Watch. “The British government 
should now finally accept human rights law 
applies to its acts anywhere in the world 
and ensure a full and independent inquiry 
into all these killings.” The decision raises 
questions about the extraterritorial juris-
diction of other human rights institutions 
as applied to Iraq and the so-called global 
war on terror. Serious allegations of viola-
tions—for instance, against the United 
States Justice Department’s decision not 
to investigate acts of torture by CIA inter-
rogators—are often brought by victims or 
human rights groups that have been left 
with little judicial recourse. Although the 
ECtHR decision would not apply to the 
United States, if such allegations were to 
implicate a European citizen, there could 
be a method for victims or rights advocates 
to seek redress after the court’s decisions in 
Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda.
Additional cases concerning the 
UK’s involvement in Iraq could follow 
at the ECtHR, or domestic courts may 
begin to adhere to the new precedent. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction could also 
become relevant with Europe’s lead in sup-
porting the Arab Spring, especially Libya. 
Under current circumstances, it is unlikely 
the ECtHR would rule that any member 
state meets the jurisdictional standards 
in Libya unless involvement expands. 
However, as member states consider the 
nature of their involvement or occupation 
abroad, the Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda deci-
sions could, taken together, guide military 
policy and influence the legal approach of 
human rights groups to alleged violations.
Matthew Lopas, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the European Court of 
Human Rights for the Human Rights Brief.
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AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
AFRICAN COMMITTEE FINDS KENYA 
IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS AND 
WELFARE OF THE CHILD
In its landmark decision in Nubian 
Minors v. Kenya, the African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (Committee) for the first time found 
that the Government of Kenya had violated 
the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (Children’s Charter) in 
its treatment of Kenyan children of Nubian 
descent. As an organization with a mandate 
to protect and promote rights and welfare 
of the child, the Committee oversees the 
implementation of the Children’s Charter. 
Accordingly, following a Communication 
filed by the Institute for Human Rights 
and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and 
Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), 
the Committee found that the Kenyan 
government has failed to ensure Nubian 
children the right to Kenyan citizenship at 
birth, which creates a myriad of obstacles 
throughout their development.
Though Article 14 of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution confers citizenship to persons 
born within the country with at least one 
parent also born in Kenya, Nubians have 
historically been considered aliens with-
out protection and benefits of citizenship 
despite meeting the legal requirements. 
Consequently, Nubian children grow up
virtually stateless, without the citizenship 
status afforded to all other children born 
within Kenya’s borders. According to the 
Communication, public hospitals in Kenya 
routinely deny Nubian parents birth cer-
tificates for their children, often provid-
ing the pretext that the parents—having 
faced discrimination themselves—lack 
valid identification. Without a birth cer-
tificate, Nubian children are thereafter 
denied essential government benefits, such 
as access to education and health care. By 
age 18, they must undergo a complex and 
lengthy vetting process to obtain an iden-
tification card that proves their Kenyan 
citizenship. As adults without the proper 
identification, Nubians will not have the 
right to own property and they will face 
many obstacles when seeking employment. 
Taken together, these forms of state-spon-
sored discrimination trap Nubian children 
in poverty and limit their opportunities for 
personal development.
As a State Party to the Children’s 
Charter, Kenya has an obligation to protect 
the rights of children. Pursuant to Article 
44 of the Charter, the Committee has 
jurisdiction to review the Communication 
against Kenya. Specifically, IHRDA and 
OSJI alleged violations of Article 6(2), 
6(3), and 6(4), which guarantee the right 
to nationality upon birth and the proper 
registration of such. The IHRDA and OSJI 
further alleged violations of Article 3, 
which prohibits unlawful discrimination 
inter alia based on ethnicity, and Articles 
11(3) and 14(2), which grant equal access 
to education and health care, respectively.
In its decision, the Committee found 
that under Article 6(4), Kenya is required 
to take measures to ensure that children 
have nationality upon birth. The Committee 
also found that Kenya violated Article 3, 
because of a discriminatory practice in the 
country toward children protected under 
the Charter that does not serve a legitimate 
state interest, but rather renders Nubian 
children stateless. The Committee also held 
that limited access to education and health-
care stemmed from a preexisting violation 
of Articles 6(2) and 6(3). The Committee 
recommended that Kenya take legislative 
and administrative measures to ensure that 
Nubian children received citizenship, and
to implement a non-discriminatory birth 
registration practices. The Committee also 
recommended that Kenya report on the 
implementation of such measures within 
six months.
The decision is a milestone in the 
fulfillment of a founding principle of 
the Charter, to ensure the rights of chil-
dren regardless of race or ethnicity. The 
Committee’s decision is made publicly 
available, and Kenya is required to submit 
a report on measures implemented to com-
ply with the decision. Accordingly, Kenya 
has to institute mechanisms to ensure that 
hospitals allow Nubian parents to register 
their children at birth. The Committee will 
appoint a member responsible for monitor-
ing compliance. In the face of noncompli-
ance, the Committee may consider bring-
ing the case to the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, pursuant to Article 5 
of the Court’s founding Protocol.
Following the Committee’s find-
ing, the Citizenship Rights in Africa 
Initiative has submitted a recommenda-
tion to the Task Force on Citizenship and 
Related Provisions of the Constitution, 
calling for a complete revision of the 
Citizenship Act to confer citizenship to 
individuals born to stateless parents in 
Kenya. Established by Kenya’s Minister 
of State for Immigration and Registration 
of Persons, the task force should act on 
the recommendation to supplement the 
citizenship provision of the constitution to 
comply with the recommendation of the 
Committee. With no supporting legal foun-
dation, the Kenyan vetting process—which 
requires an additional proof of identity for 
Nubians and an interview before a vetting 
committee to obtain identification docu-
ment—should also be revoked. Ultimately, 
Kenya ought to grant Nubian children 
citizenship to demonstrate its recognition 
of Nubians as Kenyans by birth, entitled to 
equal benefits and protection afford to all 
citizens in the country.
THE KAMPALA CONVENTION: BRIDGING 
THE GAP IN THE PROTECTION OF 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE 
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
Forced to leave their homes due to 
violent conflicts, gross human rights vio-
lations or natural disasters, an estimated 
12 million people in Africa are classified 
as internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
among the most vulnerable groups with 
little to no legal protection in the African 
human rights system. IDPs do not cross 
international borders, and therefore are not 
beneficiaries of international laws protect-
ing refugees. IDPs are often forced into 
host communities within their countries 
where they continue to face security risks 
while also confronting hardships accessing 
basic necessities, such as food and water. 
Though IDPs in Africa are entitled to the 
general rights and protections enshrined 
in regional human rights instruments, such 
protections do not address the concerns 
unique to them. In 2009, the African Union 
(AU) unanimously adopted the Convention 
for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs 
(Kampala Convention), the first legal 
instrument of its kind throughout the inter-
national community. While the Kampala 
Convention was at the time of its con-
struction a historic advancement—adopted 
unanimously by the AU— the document 
is to date not legally enforceable because 
it has not received ratification by fifteen 
countries.
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The Kampala Convention represents the 
first attempt by the African Union—and 
the international community as a whole—
to enumerate legally binding State Party 
obligations toward IDPs. The Kampala 
Convention provides legal protection for 
IDPs on three fronts: Article 3 requires 
signatory states to take steps to prevent 
displacement, including incorporating the 
Convention into their domestic law to 
ensure compliance; Articles 5 and 9 out-
line state obligations to protect and assist 
IDPs once they are displaced, including 
facilitating access for humanitarian orga-
nizations; and Article 11 requires states to 
take measures to sustainably reintegrate 
IDPs back into the society. Article 6 out-
lines the responsibilities of international 
organizations and humanitarian agencies 
when providing aid. Where States Parties 
fail in their obligations, Article 12 compels 
them to provide compensation to redress 
any transgression the IDP may have suf-
fered as a result, and further seeks to hold 
armed forces accountable for any criminal 
acts they commit against IDPs.
Many states lack the political will, or 
simply do not prioritize the problems of 
IDPs in their national agenda. When a 
State ratifies the Kampala Convention, it 
becomes legally bound to adopt imple-
menting legislation and align its domes-
tic approach to that of the Convention, 
which may implicates a change in the 
current political culture. Ratification, thus, 
requires the concerted political will of 
key officials, which seems to be lacking 
in those states that have not ratified the 
Convention. Specific provisions, such as 
Article 10—which requires states to pre-
vent displacement due to private develop-
ment projects implicates land rights and 
foreign investment—and Article 11—
which requires states to provide repara-
tions—leave state parliaments reluctant to 
ratify the Convention.
States Parties may also lack the capac-
ity or resources to comply with the obli-
gation of Kampala Convention. In many 
states, the needs of IDPs outmatch and 
overwhelm the limited resources state bud-
gets can apportion to assist them. However, 
though the Kampala Convention places a 
heavy—though necessary—financial bur-
den on states to structure their domestic 
laws to ensure compliance, this burden is 
balanced by Article 8, which articulates the 
State’s right to seek assistance from the AU. 
Moreover, the Kampala Convention pro-
vides for cooperation among states within 
the AU, and between states and various 
international organizations and humanitar-
ian agencies.
Thirty-one countries in AU have signed 
the Convention without ratification, which, 
under customary international law, requires 
the signatory states not to act in a way 
contrary to the purpose of the Convention 
even though it has not entered into force. 
Some states, such as Uganda—the first to 
ratify—have actively pursued implementa-
tion. Prior to ratification in the Gambia, 
there was a campaign to educate national 
assembly members and various civil soci-
ety organizations about the benefits of 
the Kampala Convention, which seemed 
to propel the ratification process. All 
African states ought to ratify the Kampala 
Convention not only as a way of protect-
ing IDPs once an armed conflict or natural 
disaster breaks out, but also as a preven-
tative measure to prevent displacement 
before it rises to the level of a humanitarian 
crisis. There is a gap in the protection of 
IDPs in the African regional human rights 
system, and the Kampala Convention is the 
legal instrument that will aid in bridging 
that gap.
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